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EIGHT
The Theology of Grace 
as the Hermeneutics of Salvation and Liberation
A.J.M. van den Hoogen
Introduction
The third part of the Catechism o f the Catholic Church is devoted to “Life 
in Christ.” Chapter three of this part is entitled “God’s Salvation: Law and 
Grace.” In this chapter a central aspect of the Christian way of speaking 
about human existence is discussed, namely, speaking about the reality of 
grace. This contribution will examine this theme. We will discuss such ques­
tions as: the theological connection between speaking about human acts with 
respect to morality and speaking about grace (1); the experiential reality to 
which speaking about grace refers (2); the connection between the contem­
porary experience of reality, the experience of grace, and the moral nature 
of human acts (3).
Moral Acts and the Experience o f Grace
In order to give the fundamental moral character of human acts a foundation, 
the starting point of the text of the Catechism is a theological reflection with 
respect to human destiny. We will first determine the course of this reflec­
tion and then examine how the moral nature of human acts is described theo­
logically.
Human Acts from the Perspective o f Human Destiny
In the structure of the Catechism the moral character of human acts is dis­
cussed within a framework that is described as “Life in Christ,” and, more 
specifically, from the viewpoint of “Life in the Spirit.” Life in the Spirit de­
scribes the vocation of human beings, as the text clearly states.
Now the text makes it clear that human destiny is viewed from the per­
spective of the human vocation, and that this vocation should be discussed 
from two viewpoints (cf. 1699-1700). On the one hand, this vocation con-
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sists in human dignity, a dignity that is intrinsically related to the creation of 
humankind. On the other hand, this vocation exists in the growth toward per­
fection, which is realized in acts directed toward what is good. Thus, in this 
approach human acts have an intrinsic purposiveness (teleology). The text 
describes this as follows: “In man, true freedom is an ‘outstanding manifest­
ation of the divine image’” (1712). This already demonstrates a certain 
choice in the Catechism’s train of thought, namely, to view human acts less 
as conditioned by circumstances and more as arising from an initial freedom. 
It is unfortunate that this choice is not itself defended, as this would have 
connected the Catechism much more directly with important moral debates 
that are now taking place in Western culture.
The text of the Catechism does give a theological justification for this 
choice of a teleological approach to acts. The first dimension of this theolog­
ical teleology reads: “Christ ... makes man fully manifest to man himself 
and brings to light his exalted vocation” (1710); the second dimension of this 
theological teleology states that the human being is able to know this voca­
tion actively, for he is “from his very conception ordered to God and destin­
ed for eternal beatitude” (1711). And the third dimension is encountered in 
the following text: “Man is [consequently, one might say] obliged to follow 
the moral law, which urges him ‘to do what is good and avoid what is evil.’ 
This law makes itself heard in his conscience” (1713).
Law and Grace: The Theological Interpretation o f Human Acts
The almost logical (in this case, syllogistic) reasoning that forms the content 
of the Catechism’s theological teleology should not lose sight of the fact that 
the Catechism’s text wishes to place human acts explicitly within a salvific 
historic framework (cf. also 1739-1742). That salvific historical framework 
is drawn by means of the Pauline concepts ‘law’ and ‘grace’. I will analyze 
more closely the way in which the Catechism elaborates on this framework 
in this subsection. It is an important issue because the Catechism’s text wants 
to place human acts within a theological teleology.
An Example from Paul
That there is a connection between moral acts and ‘life in Christ’ is probably 
better worked out by Paul than anyone else when he, for example, in the 
first letter to the Corinthians traces back the confession that Jesus is the Lord 
to the working of the Spirit of God and emphasizes that this confession can 
be understood as a word of true wisdom under the influence of the Spirit of 
God. This wisdom has its roots in love and its test is suffering. The rule by 
which people are called to live is a dynamic that is kept under tension by the 
contrasts between love and suffering. For him, the outstanding reason for
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speaking of love and suffering is his experience with and insight into the 
meaning of life and the destiny of Jesus Christ. This specific framework of 
reference leads him to ask again and again the question of how the Torah 
developed and was enriched in the history and new life of Jesus of Nazareth. 
This is Paul’s framework of reference when he speaks of love and suffering. 
Speaking of law and grace, and asking himself the question of what true wis­
dom includes, Paul asks how the true rule of life is descried in the history, 
suffering, and new life of Jesus Christ, and how the Jewish Torah (‘a lamp 
for your feet’, as the rabbinic metaphor has it) develops and is enriched. It 
is especially the experiences with the contrasts between love and suffering, 
also and particularly applied in the history of Jesus of Nazareth, that bring 
him to the weighty question of the relationship between law and grace.
For Paul there are no general anthropological issues at stake in this, al­
though his Jewish and Hellenistic religious language has constituted the occa­
sion for the outlines and concepts of theological anthropology. It is the fate 
of Paul’s deep searching observations on the history of the Torah that they 
are not as well received in the rabbinic oral traditions as they are in Stoic, 
Romance, and scholastic Christian schemes of thought. This still occurs in 
the Catechism’s text, in which, for example, the Pauline way of speaking 
concerning the law is directly linked to the philosophical category of moral 
law and Christian Stoic thinking on ‘wisdom’ (cf. 1950-1951). The Pauline 
terminology with regard to the old law and the New Law has been linked to 
various ‘worldviews’ that have endeavoured to understand the ‘law’, the 
‘ordo\ and the 'ratio' of all reality ‘as history (Geschichte) .’
One of the results of using Paul’s theology in this way is that his speci­
fic point of reference is sometimes scarcely recognizable in the several theo­
logical elaborations on salvation history. The thematic, historical, and, in 
Paul’s eyes, irreplaceable death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth was 
often hidden behind the use of general terminology. These terms no longer 
make clear that one cannot speak of a theology of grace without speaking of 
the experience of a rupture. They no longer disclose that one cannot speak 
of a theology of grace without reference to that irretrievable moment of 
God’s revelatory acts in the tension between love and suffering that has be­
come the historical fate and destiny of the praxis of life and the authentic 
faith in the God of Jesus of Nazareth. It should also be added immediately 
that this rupture is also a part of the experience of all who follow in the foot­
steps of Jesus of Nazareth. The imetanoia\ conversion, is the ‘story’ par ex­
cellence that attempt to give words to the descrying of God’s surprising, rev­
elatory acts. Faith implies a discovery that—however described as processual 
or literary—is immediately joined with a commitment that affects and renews 
one’s life. This commitment discovers ‘life’ in experiences with ‘death’ and 
declares to be ‘death’ what looked like ‘life’. It is a commitment that does
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not leave a single fragment of someone’s life unaifected and knows no way 
‘back’.
Justification: Rupture and Reformation
Within the theological traditions that appeared after Paul, the schemas of sal­
vation history have often left little room for the ‘interruptions’ (J.-B. Metz) 
that are non-negotiable aspects of thinking about God’s revelatory acts and 
of the conversion that occurs among people when they receive a glimpse of 
these acts of God. That is why it is important to deal explicitly with the 
framework of salvation history for human acts. The framework and the sub­
ject interpret each other mutually.
In the train of thought of the Catechism’s authors, emphasis is placed 
not so much on the experiences of the rupture which lie within “the grace of 
the Holy Spirit” (1987) as on the renewing connection of the conversion, of 
the “New Law or the Law of the Gospel” (1965) with the Old Law (1961- 
1964). The Catechism seems to want to place much emphasis on the fact that 
the ‘New Law’, although it is perfecting and renewing, is linked to the ‘Old 
Law’. This terminology entails a problem completely different from that of 
Paul’s presentation of the question. Paul’s question was how the Torah’s rule 
for living relates to Jesus’ rule for living. As a theological interpretation, the 
Torah’s rule for living held that it was the way of the covenant of Yahweh 
with his (Jewish) people. Jesus’ rule for living, as a theological interpreta­
tion, held that it was the way of the new covenant ‘through his blood’. Also 
connected with these theological questions were the questions of theological 
meaning and of the scope of Paul’s mission and the first Christian communi­
ties. Already here one can see that orthopraxis precedes orthodoxy. The Cat­
echism’s question is a different one, i.e., the question of whether the moral 
views of the Roman Catholic Church and their foundations can claim univer­
sal validity (cf. 1956). The term ‘old law’ refers primarily to a foundation, 
viewed as immutable, of the moral acts that endure in the midst of all histor­
ical variations (cf. 1958), and which human beings can know through their 
reason and should follow in conscience. In addition, the term ‘old law’ refers 
to the Torah, now summarized in the Ten Commandments. In a Stoicist 
model of thought, which goes back to the patriarchal theology of Irenaeus 
and Augustine, as well as others, this ‘old law’ is described in its two mean­
ings as a “preparation for the Gospel” (1964). Here too one finds reference 
to an orthopraxis that appears to precede this explanation of the ‘orthodoxy’. 
Now it concerns “the moral catechesis of the apostolic teachings” (1971) and 
the sacramental praxis of the Roman Catholic Church (1972).
By placing so much emphasis on the renewing connection of the ‘New 
Law’ to the ‘old law’, the emphasis is also placed more strongly on a theol­
ogy that confirms that faith in Jesus Christ has a significance that can be uni­
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versalized, and that consequently the moral language of the Roman Catholic 
Church also has this significance. Because of this, faith assumes the charac­
ter of endorsing the cooperation between the grace of God and the freedom 
of human beings (1993) much more than that of a rupturing experience that 
uproots human beings and confronts them with contextually determined 
choices. And the renewal that is attributed to the experience of the Holy 
Spirit is depicted much more as a renewal of humankind in society and cul­
ture (cf. 1995). Completely within the tradition of the Council fathers of 
Trent and their opposition to Martin Luther’s theological basis of the ‘free­
dom of a Christian person’, the Catechism directs one’s attention not so 
much to the personal relation of the person with his or her God, a relation 
that is also contextually determined in its experience of rupturing. Rather, 
the Catechism calls one’s attention to the meaning that the sacramental praxis 
has for the realization and renewal that the faith relation of people with God 
has for moral actions. Through these accents the Catechism’s authors (still) 
appear to see Kantian moral philosophy as the greatest challenge in our 
(Western) culture puts to the church and its discussion, which seeks for uni­
versality, of the human vocation.
The Experience o f Grace
“Since it belongs to the supernatural order, grace escapes our experience and 
cannot be known except by faith. We cannot therefore rely on our feelings 
or our works to conclude that we are justified and saved” (2005). This quote 
demands thorough reflection. It is immediately recognizable as fitting into 
the classic theology of grace, which in its Neo-Thomistic form is characteriz­
ed by a dualism between the reality of grace and the reality of experience 
and by a dualism between faith and knowledge. We will first ask whether 
biblical statements inevitably cause such a dualism, and then we work out 
what people in the past attempted to achieve with such a dualism.
The Salvific, Conciliatory Concern o f God fo r Human Beings
The word ‘grace’ is a specifically Christian term insofar as it indicates the 
totality of God’s salvific and conciliatory concern for human beings that has 
been revealed in Jesus Christ. This salvific and conciliatory concern on the 
part of God for human beings is indicated in Scripture through several differ­
ent terms and characterizations, and these terms often stem from the Tanakh, 
the Jewish tradition of faith.
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O.H. Pesch distinguishes five central concepts in reference to this. First 
he refers to the word hânan.1 This term refers to a favour granted to some­
one upon which that someone cannot make any claim. One experiences it 
spontaneously and one may pray for it, but it is always given freely to hu­
man beings by divine will (cf. Genesis 6:8, Exodus 33:12-16). God’s activity 
of hânan is expressed through a number of gifts, which are recognized in 
‘saving from distress’, in ‘communion with God’, and everything the lies be­
tween them. In the Septuagint (the Greek translation of the Old Testament, 
abbreviated as LXX) the word is translated as charis, the later ‘technical’, 
that is to say, ‘summarizing’ word for grace in the New Testament. There 
is, however, also a great difference between hânan and charis. The former 
concerns one’s turning toward one’s fellow human being, while the initial 
meaning of charis is that which causes happiness, appears to be pleasant, and 
thus it refers to sweetness, charm, ‘grace’. The Hebrew hânan does not have 
the dualism of an internal disposition that is externalized in or caused by ex­
ternal deeds of kindness. The ‘turning toward’ is seen as an answer to a flaw 
in another, a flaw that is expressed in begging or pleading. Originally, hânan 
did not have a religious meaning. Where it did acquire a religious meaning 
in the Jewish tradition of faith, Yahweh’s activity of hânan has to do with 
human life: healing (for example, Psalm 6:2), salvation from distress (for ex­
ample, Psalm 9:13-14), release from fear (for example, Genesis 42:21), sal­
vation or redemption (for example, Psalm 26:11), ‘restoration’ (Psalm 41:4), 
forgiveness of sins (Psalm 41:3), and strength (Psalm 86:16).
Subsequently, Pesch refers to the words hesed and 'émet, usually trans­
lated in the Septuagint as eleos and pistis. Hesed is often linked to 'émet. 
Hesed wa ’<émet (grace and faithfulness) is the outstanding example of cove- 
nantal terminology. Actually, hesed refers to the attitude and behaviour of 
the people, that which keeps the nation together. Hesed means reciprocity 
and faithfulness; hesed needs to answered by hesed. It transcends the scheme 
of performance and exchange. It has to do with commitment to someone’s 
life. The religious and theological meaning of this word has its roots in this 
view of interhuman relationships. With reference to people and God to use 
'émet in reference to either human beings of God means that one can cast 
oneself on their actions, words, and love. They can be trusted. It means 
trustworthiness with the nuance of dignity (from the root 'âman, which ac­
counts for the meaning of security, endurance, giving certainty). “In deter­
mining the relationship between God and his people, the central meaning of
1 Cf. O.H. Pesch, Frei sein aus Gnade: Theologische Anthropologie (Freiburg, 
1983), pp. 115-23; also cf. E. Schillebeeckx, Gerechtigheid en liefde: Genade en 
bevrijding (Bloemendaal, 1977), esp. pp.74-98.
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hesed becomes apparent from the fact that hesed is included in the great 
hymnic, liturgical proclaimers of God, in which the Tanakh praises the na­
ture of God as ‘a God of people’ (Exodus 34:6-7). God is a ‘compassionate 
and gracious God’, patient and rich in hesed wa’ëmet.”2
A fourth concept that is important is the term sëdaqah (justice), trans­
lated in the Septuagint as dikaiosunë. This concept also had a secular mean­
ing originally and received a religious meaning in a time of theocratic, na­
tionalist view of the people of Israel.3 In Israel all authority was exercised 
in the name of Yahweh, Israel’s only true king, in both secular and religious 
matters. Human justice had to do with God’s justice. Later, in Jesus’ time as 
well, the Jews no longer possessed political independence. Authority and 
community, authority and religion became separated. The concept ‘justice’ 
became desecrated. But it was linked with the meaning that an actual com­
munity practises justice. When conflicts are present, there is no ‘justice’ any­
more, neither with the one party or the other. ‘Justice’ indicates the internal 
cohesion between human good deeds and the situation with respect to the 
well-being, salvation, and happiness of the entire community.
The fifth concept Pesch mentions is rahamim, which is translated in the 
Septuagint as oiktirmos. The word is very affective. Raham means womb 
(cf. Jeremiah 20:17), the soft part of the person (Genesis 43:30). Rahamim 
is the plural form of this, referring to the tender, natural, emotional love of 
a mother for her child, and thus also compassion (cf. Hosea 11:8, Genesis 
43:30, I Kings 3:26). Hesed is linked to rahamim, through which God’s 
hesed acquires the meaning of tender, vulnerable, motherly love. This is 
present in Hosea in particular. But this connection within a double linkage 
becomes more frequent (Jeremiah 16:5, Zechariah 7:9, Psalm 25:6). This is 
why Yahweh also expects hesed from Israel in return, and in his reasoning 
the prophet says to the people: “ ‘There is no faithfulness [ ’ëmet], no love 
[hesed], no acknowledgment of God in the land’” (Hosea 4:1-2). There is 
then no longer any ‘grace’.
In the New Testament charis becomes the predominant central concept for 
‘grace’. This becomes, as it were, the ‘technical’, summarizing word for 
God’s salvific and reconciling concern for people, creating faith and love and 
evoking hope. It is through Paul in particular that the term charis has receiv­
ed this ‘technical’, summarizing meaning. The direct background for this lies 
in the wish for grace that is expressed at the beginning and/or end of Chris-
2 E. Schillebeeckx, Gerechtigheid en liefde, p .82.
3 Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, Gerechtigheid en liefde, pp. 117-18.
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tian epistolary literature.4 Greeks and Greek-speaking Jews began their 
letters with chaire (hail!). Analogous to this, we can find a greeting in the 
beginning and/or end of each work included in the ‘Pauline corpus’, the old­
est form of which is found in Paul’s letter to the Thessalonians: “The grace 
[he charts] of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you” (1 Thessalonians 1:1, 
5:28). For the rest, the reality indicated by the word grace in the New Testa­
ment is, again, expressed in many various ways—for example, adoption (Ro­
man 9:4), children of God (Matthew 5:9), the gift of the Holy Spirit (Gala- 
tions 3:5), being snatched from the dominion of darkness (Colossians 1:13), 
liberation through purchase or ransom (I Corinthians 1:18, 30), salvation and 
redemption (Luke 1:69), reconciliation after an argument (2 Colossians 
5:18), justification and sanctification (Romans 6:16), the renewal of people 
and the world (John 13:34), and living in perfection (Ephesians 2:5).
Through Paul in particular, the concept of charts has become a summar­
izing term (a terminus technicus) for that which is meant by the ‘riches of 
God’s grace’ (Ephesians 1:7b, 2:4-7, 3:8) in the New Testament. In 1 Thes­
salonians, though, it does not appear. Here Paul speaks of the “gospel of 
God” (for example, 1 Thessalonians 2:2) which is at the same time the “gos­
pel of Christ” (1 Thessalonians 3:2). This gospel entails the confession of 
“faith in God” and “faith in the coming Jesus Christ.” They, the Thessalon- 
ian Christians, “turned to God from idols to serve the living and true God,” 
and “to wait for his Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead—Jesus, 
who rescues us from the coming wrath” (1 Thessalonians 1:9-10). Here a 
summary, as it were, is of the original Christian kerygma is given to pagans, 
and there is no trace yet of charts and justification, the later key concepts in 
Paul. A key concept here is Jesus’ coming parousia (for example, 1 Thessa­
lonians 2:19, 3:13). Not until 1 Corinthians, the letter to the Galations, and 
2 Corinthians does the term charts become a terminus technicus. In 1 Corin­
thians charts appears to mean giving thanks (10:30, 15:57), especially for 
the giving of alms by the Corinthian Christians for the benefit of the com­
munity in Jerusalem (16:3) (also see 2 Corinthians 8:1-9). But charts also 
here means God’s salvific revelation in Christ and by this is actually linked 
to God’s election of them to be Christians: “ [God’s] grace given you in 
Christ Jesus” (1 Corinthians 1:4). Here the Greek meaning of charts still 
plays a role: God’s grace endows Christians with rich gifts (1:5, 6). In the 
letter to the Galations there is talk of the charts Theou (the grace of God) 
(2:19-21). The ‘gospel’ is now identified with justification: “ ... [we] know 
that a man is not justified by observing the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ. 
So we, too, have put our faith in Christ Jesus so that we may be justified by
4 Cf. O.H. Pesch, Frei sein aus Gnade, pp. 101 ff.
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faith in Christ” (2:16a). Paul sees himself as the apostle who is sent to pro­
claim this message of justification. In contrast to the usual usage of charis in 
the greetings, charis receives a very pointed meaning here: Paul was called 
by charis (1:15). “I want you to know, brothers, that the gospel I preached 
is not something that man made up. I did not receive it from any man, nor 
was I taught it; rather, I received it by revelation from Jesus Christ” (1:11). 
Charis is a revelation, of which Paul is the apostle, and the content of this 
revelation is justification through faith in Christ, by which people are freed 
from slavery (5:1).
The biblical statements do not compel one to speak of grace dualistical- 
ly. Rather, one can establish that the word ‘grace’ encompasses a variety of 
human experiences—experiences that for the rest are not traced back to a hu­
man subject of actions.
Natural and Supernatural
If the reality of grace is a revelatory reality, does ‘grace’ then belong to an 
accessible reality beyond our experience? Does ‘revelation’ mean that ‘grace’ 
falls outside of our experience? Does ‘revelation’ mean that only the pro­
clamation and kerygma make access to ‘grace’ possible? These questions be­
long first and foremost in an introduction with respect to fundamental theol­
ogy. For at issue here are the complicated issues of the relationship between 
history and revelation, the relationship between faith and knowledge, the re­
lationship between the authority of proclamation and the authority of exper­
ience. One issue deserves to be mentioned and discussed here briefly: the 
conceptual pair ‘natural/supernatural.’
The conceptual pair ‘natural/supernatural’ has long dominated theology 
in general in the modem period (in fact, since the seventeenth century) and 
certainly the treatment of grace as well. Although the term ‘supernatural’ al­
ready appears as a technical term in Thomas Aquinas in the “Quaestiones 
Disputatae de Veritate” (1256-1259), the conceptual pair ‘natural/supema- 
tural’ acquires a specific meaning in the modern period. Thomas refers to 
God as the ‘supernatural principle (principium supernaturale) '.5 But with 
respect to Thomas one should understand this from a theological view of 
‘natural’ reality. Our concrete reality is, in this view, assimilated into a 
process. It comes out of (exitus) and returns to (reditus) God. Creation, 
people, sin, and grace are given a place in a system of thought that views 
everything as emanating from God, who creates, preserves, and, when they
5 Cf. “Ubernatiirlich,” in: LThK, vol. 10, pp.437-40.
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return to God, glorifies and sanctifies.6 This schema of emanating and re­
turning does not share our modem concept of historicity, but it is neverthe­
less a schema in which reflection on concrete reality occurs in the light of 
God’s concern for people and the world, and which has no reference to an­
other supernatural ‘order’. The state of grace is, in Thomas’ view, that the 
eternal love of God is concerned and related in a creative way with that 
which is the centre of being human—‘freedom’, we would say today. 
Through this concern and relatedness people are, as it were, ‘lifted up’ out 
of their finitude, ‘pulled up high’ to share in the communion with God, to 
share in the life of God. And from that sharing in the communion with God 
also flows the involvement of people with God as it acquires shape in faith, 
hope, and love.7
Thus in Thomas’ view there is no such thing as an antithesis between 
grace and human reality. There is talk of a distinction between grace and hu­
man reality, but that distinction arises from the conviction that God’s in­
volvement with people is relational in nature and that the concern of God is 
directed toward the salvation of all people. In the modem period (that is, 
since the seventeenth century) that distinction becomes an ‘antithesis’, and 
the relationship between the reality of grace (supernatural) and human (natur­
al) reality is viewed as a competition (Schoonenberg), an idea that has be­
come characteristic of Neo-Scholastic theology.8 In a well-known Neo-Scho­
6 Cf. M.-D. Chenu, “Le plan de las Somme Théologique de saint Thomas,” in: 
Rev. Thom. 45 (1939): 93-107.
7 Cf. O.H. Pesch and A. Peters, Einführung in die Lehre von Gnade und 
Rechtfertigung (Darmstadt, 1981),'p . 89.
8 Neo-scholastic theology is that theology whose framework is the so-called ‘con­
temporary scholasticism*, which began at the end of the eighteenth century and, par­
ticularly since the middle of the nineteenth century, continued as a form of Christian 
philosophy, which is based chiefly on the rediscovery of the work of Thomas Aquin­
as (cf. “Contemporary Scholasticism,” in: New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII 
(New York, 1967), pp. 1165ÎF.; “Le renouveau de la scholastique,” inD.Th.C, Vol. 
XV/1 (Paris, 1946), pp.426ff.) Thus initially Neo-scholasticism was a form of philo­
sophy, but very much influenced by theology, particularly by its ideal of knowledge,
i.e., the ability to form concepts that give a logical, exhaustive definition of reality 
and are therefore logically necessary. Since the so-called ‘nouvelle théologie’ that 
arose in the thirties in Europe, in France and Germany as well, it was this ideal of 
knowledge against which people strove. This ideal denies in particular that theology 
and faith concern God’s mystery and the secret of life of people and moreover denies 
that faith has reference to salvific history. Also cf. A.G.M. Van Meisen, “Wat 
maakte het neothomisme zo attractief?” in: B. Delfgaauw, et al., De Wijsgerige 
Thomas: Terugblik op het neothomisme (Baarn, 1984), pp .28-48.
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lastic textbook for dogmatics by F. Diekamp, Katholische Dogmatik nach 
den Grundsätzen des hl. Thomas (1912-1914), on the relationship between 
grace and reality one reads: “a nature perfect in itself, equipped with every­
thing that is necessary, appropriates the supernatural like a superadditum.”9 
In this quotation two points are immediately striking. First of all, reality is 
thought of as ‘closed’. This does not exclude the fact that this reality is attri­
buted with its own dynamics. “Naturally this is what belongs,to nature, that 
which is constitutive for it, or belongs to its results, or belongs to her re­
quirements,” states Diekamp. (For example, it is the nature of the eye that 
it can see, that it actually does see and that there is light that makes things 
visible.) The second striking point is that grace is viewed as an ‘added real­
ity’. What then is ‘supernatural’? The answer is: that which does not belong 
to nature. Formulated in a positive way, “the supernatural (supernatura) is 
a gift that owes nothing to nature, a gift that is added to nature (donum in­
debitum et superadditum) .”
Thus in this Neo-Scholastic view grace and human reality are viewed as 
‘two levels’ (L. Boff) which are stacked upon each other yet have no internal 
connection. And it is particularly the view of ‘nature’ that in this view hin­
ders one from being able to conceive of an internal reference between grace 
and reality. Already years ago the Dutch theologian P. Schoonenberg pointed 
out the implications this has for anthropology. It is then impossible to recon­
cile God’s real involvement in human reality with the freedom of human be­
ings. In this view God’s actions are always at the cost of that of people, and 
human activity is at the cost of God’s involvement. In particular, as long as 
this involvement of people in the world and of God in human reality is seen 
as a form of causality, in this view of natural and supernatural one cannot 
resolve the conflict between these two ‘causalities.’10
Boff then also correctly concludes that in the Neo-Scholastic view it is 
impossible to experience grace. Grace belongs to another supernatural order 
that is inaccessible to human experience. It was not the intention of such a 
theology to discuss grace as a reality that can be experienced. After all, it 
was a theology that attempted to formulate “universally valid insights” (Van 
Meisen). When it is asked today whether people can experience grace, there 
is a completely different intention in the question, an intention that is funda­
mentally different from that of Neo-Scholasticism on several points. Two 
points of difference in particular are important. First, much of contemporary
9 Cited by L. Boff, Erfahrung von Gnade: Entwurf einer Gnadenlehre (Düssel­
dorf, 1978), p .66.
10 Cf. P. Schoonenberg, Hij is een God van mensen (’s-Hertogenbosch, 1969), 
p p .9-14 especially.
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theology has once again discovered that while Scripture and theologians such 
as Thomas Aquinas do distinguish between grace and human reality, they do 
not make them antithetical to each other. Charts or gratia refers to God in 
his concern for concrete people in their concrete reality. Secondly, much of 
contemporary theology has once again discovered that we should not think of 
this concrete reality as a ‘closed’, albeit ‘dynamic’, reality. Neither from a 
metaphysical nor historical quest into reality does our experience of multipli­
city and mutability appear to be adequately explained and understood if one 
takes this as one’s starting point. It would be better, Boff suggests, if we 
stopped speaking in terms of natural/supernatural.11
The Experience o f Grace as Interpreted Experience
Is one able to experience ‘grace’? Even if one has consciously departed from 
the neo-scholastic schema of nature/supemature and replaced it with the 
schema of grace and freedom (freedom being understood in the concrete con­
text in which freedom must be liberated), this question cannot simply be an­
swered with ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Whoever answers ‘no’ thereby probably admits to 
not having been able to discover anything ‘revelatory’ in the biblical images 
and metaphors by which the experience of grace of believers in the Jewish 
and Christian traditions was expressed. Whoever answers ‘yes’ does recog­
nize in one’s own reality something of those promises of the experience of 
God’s concern which is expressed in the biblical metaphors. Theological re­
flection can contribute to clearing up misunderstandings that hinder this 
recognition, and it can also contribute new models of understanding that are 
justifiable; but it cannot bring it about that a person in his or her own life or 
a group in its own community come to this recognition.
In the theology of grace, therefore, when it is said that people can ex­
perience ‘grace’, it is an attempt, following the footsteps of those who an­
swer ‘yes’, to clarify an experience in the presence of those who say ‘yes’ 
but also in the presence of those who answer ‘no’. It is thus an attempt to 
clarify an experience that arises in the witness of believing people, where it 
concerns the experience that in our human existence can illuminate a moment 
of gratuity that can give meaning to our existence, offer a perspective, can 
become a power for the renewal of people and the world. In the Jewish and 
Christian traditions of faith there is the trust that ‘models of understanding’ 
can also be borrowed from our experience, models that cause one ‘to do’ 
and ‘to think’, in which this “mystery of compassion” (Schillebeeckx) can be 
expressed in a trustworthy manner, although it is always and by definition 
partial. For, one can say with Schillebeeckx,
11 Cf. L. Boff, Erfahrung von Gnade, p .72.
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revelation possesses a structure of experience. The good that certain people 
experienced in Jesus was experienced and identified as divine salvation. 
That which was actually experienced in Jesus by Christians was therefore 
neither pure ‘conclusion ’ nor pure ‘immediate ’ experience, but interpretive 
experience—the experience of faith. Because of the surprising newness of 
their experience of salvation in Jesus they also wish to place it emphatical­
ly in line with their Jewish-religious tradition of experience, which caused 
them to experience Jesus interpreted in such a way as if they actually ex­
perienced him. ... At the same time this led to a reinterpretation of this 
history from the experience of a renewed history. From this there finally 
grew a religious view on total history: unity of a divine plan, decree or di­
vine ordainment, that is unfolded in and through the history of people. In 
continually changing situations, in continually new words, the Christian 
community of faith will ultimately continue to say nothing but that they ex­
perience divine salvation in Jesus Christ, even in philosophical concepts 
that are sometimes very complex. If the old concepts or interpretive mo­
ments no longer apply in new situations and if the needs and requirements 
change, the interpretive concepts also change. But the source experience 
remains the same in this change: in their own individual situations people 
continue to experience divine salvation in Jesus.12
The Experience o f Grace and the Moral Nature o f Human Actions
At the end of the first section the question was asked as to whether in the 
text of the Catechism (still) sees Kantian moral philosophy as the greatest 
challenge that our (Western) culture puts to the church and its discussion, 
which seeks for universality, of the human vocation. The second section has 
indicated a way along which, according to many contemporary theologians, 
the dilemma between grace and the experience (of freedom) can be trans­
cended and the tension between the two can be made productive. This third 
section will specifically deal with the moral aspect of the experience of free­
dom. The question is now whether the tension between the reality of grace 
as endorsed in faith and the moral aspect of the experience of faith can be 
made productive.
Morality and the Experience o f Grace
In the Catechism much attention is paid to the idea that—first—an inalienable 
moral dimension should be attributed to human actions and that this moral
12 E. Schillebeeckx, Gerechtigheid en liefde, p .55, italics mine.
160 Th e  Th eo lo g y  o f G r ace
dimension is, theologically speaking, a free response on the part of human 
beings to the free intiative of God (see numbers 1996-2005 in particular). 
The Catechism’s text joins in forcefully with the thought of the great theolo­
gian Augustine. With this the text also joins in with that which, since Augus­
tine, has become the core issue of the tractatus de gratia that originated 
through his work: the relationship between human freedom and experience 
of grace. This was a very complicated issue already in the time of Augus­
tine, not in the least because Augustine himself also changed his views dur­
ing the course of his life and finally came to endorse a view in which there 
was hardly room to speak of true human freedom. Fortunately, the text of 
this Catechism does not follow Augustine this far. The view that is present 
in the Catechism is close to the position to which the Council fathers of 
Trent subscribed.
A key problem in Augustine was his insight that a fundamental broken­
ness continued to dominate his moral actions. “What I do not want to do I 
do, and what I want to do I do not do,” he says in his Confessions. It is a 
way of consideration that arises from a glance ‘within’, a way of considera­
tion that searches for an answer to the (for Augustine) pressing question of 
why human actions are not thoroughly transparent, why the rationality of the 
will is apparently insufficient to penetrate the motives of our actions. Appar­
ently, his insight says, the human will to live according to God’s law is not 
enough to deal with God from within one’s life.
Augustine then comes to the faithful conviction that life with God has an 
aspect which he calls gratia preveniens. God’s grace (cf. 2001) already sur­
rounds people, even before there is talk of exercising human will. For 
Augustine, especially in his Confessions, this was an insight that created 
room within the acknowledgement of God’s turning toward us to be able to 
continue to acknowledge that the human will is in our experience so often 
thwarted by human desires. For the Council fathers of Trent the insight into 
the gratia preveniens—which had in the meantime already expanded into an 
established element of the treatment of grace—was an important aspect of 
their resistance to Martin Luther’s Reformation. They wanted to hold onto 
the theological meaning of the sacraments of the church, and according to 
their insight this meaning lay in the necessary mediation and confirmation of 
life with God. In the Catechism it almost sounds like a pietistic alternative 
for the emphasis that since Kant has been placed on the autonomous rational­
ity of the human will: the gratia preveniens “is needed to arouse and sustain 
our collaboration in justification through faith and sanctification through 
charity” (2001).
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Morality, the Experience o f Grace, and Historical Awareness
Since Kant, the insight has grown in our Western culture that the autono­
mous rationality of the human will itself has a public character. The subject 
is a public subject. The public character and the moral character go hand in 
hand.
Earlier in this article I pointed out that the text in the Catechism sought 
another position, a position that cannot be called the ‘enlightenment of the 
Enlightenment’ but rather a contra-Enlightenment position. It is typical of the 
Catechism’s position that, among other things, an alternative for the public 
dimension of morality also fits within this. The public dimension of moral 
actions is, in the view of the Catechism, fulfilled by the sacramental and 
judicial aspects of the church.
This view on the church in its function of public dimension of moral ac­
tions is candidly discussed in a text that is taken directly from the ecclesiasti­
cal codex: “To the Church belongs the right always and everywhere to an­
nounce moral principles, including those pertaining to the social order, and 
to make judgments on any human affairs to the extent that they are required 
by the fundamental rights of the human person or the salvation of souls” 
(2032). But the view on the Church as a public dimension of moral actions 
also appears, albeit indirectly, in the texts on the doctrine of the ‘merit’ and 
that of ‘sanctification’. The first category as the Catechism gives it is a cate­
gory that has reference to the public character of moral actions. “M erit,” 
says the text, “refers in general to the recompense owed by a community or 
a society for the action of one of its members” (2006). This recompense 
rests on the principles of justification and equality. After this definition the 
text of the Catechism applies this fact to the relationship between God and 
human being, again in the light of that which is said on gratia preveniens. 
“God has freely chosen to associate man with the work of his grace.” God 
initiates, and human deeds are secondary (2008). The Catechism classifies 
the ‘goods’ (bona) that arise from these actions as aspects of the “spiritual 
progress [that] tends toward ever more intimate union with Christ. This 
union is called ‘mystical’ because it participates in the mystery of Christ 
through the sacraments” (2014). In this one can see the crowning of a posi­
tion that can be described as ‘Catholic pietism’. In it is placed the core of the 
alternative that the Catechism formulates for the moral subject of the En­
lightenment.
In order to define clearly the import of this Catholic pietism, I will com­
pare this position with a ‘theology of the signs of the times’. This position 
refers to salvation history when one interprets one’s own history from within 
and bases it in the framework of the promises and fulfilments of divine prov­
idence. Such an interpretation of one’s own history implies a historical analy­
sis of the developments of the history that we are both witnessing and experi­
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encing now. In Gaudium et Spes (GS) this is expressed as follows. It is said 
of the church that its goal is “to carry on the work of Christ under the guid­
ance of the Holy Spirit, for he came into the world to bear witness to the 
truth, to save and not to judge, to serve and not to be served” (no. 3). This 
text concludes the foreword of Gaudium et Spes. Following immediately is 
the statement, “At all times the Church carries the responsibility of reading 
the signs o f the times and o f interpreting them in the light o f the Gospel, if 
it is to carry out its task. In language intelligible to every generation, she 
should be able to answer the ever recurring questions which men ask about 
the meaning of this present life and of the life to come, and how one is rela­
ted to the other.”13
The French theologian and historian M.-D. Chenu has given an interest­
ing interpretation of the passage on the “understanding of the signs of the 
times in the light of the Gospel.” A number of aspects of this will be discus­
sed here.14 In the past acquaintance with the phrase ‘the signs of the times’ 
stemmed primarily from exegesis—there was no place for it in contemporary 
theology. Given its origin (Matthew 16:3), it was linked primarily with the 
idea of the ‘end of time’ and not with actual history. The text of Vatican 
Council II, however, links the phrase emphatically with actual and continuing 
history. With the introduction of the phrase in Gaudium et Spes it acquires 
a new and renewed meaning for theology.15 There has also been opposition 
to it. Some have indicated that the phrase has a christological and eschatolo- 
gical meaning in Scripture, while this is not as clearly the case in the concil- 
iar text. Others stress that with the use of this term GS did not give enough 
attention to the transcendence of the Kingdom of God over against history 
and not enough attention to the negative aspects of history, evil, and sin. 
Chenu acknowledges these objections. But more important in his eyes is the 
fact that the phrase formulates an epistemological principle of a “concrete, 
historical theology.” The phrase ‘signs of the times’ is therefore the same as 
understanding which paradigmatic change or renaissance appears in our time. 
Observation of the signs of the times is therefore also a ‘practical’ opportun­
ity. It is linked intrinsically to actions that are directed toward the realization
13 Cf. The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: Vatican II, 
Gaudium et Spes (Dublin, 1975).
14 Cf. T. Van den Hoogen, Pastorale Theologie: Ontwikkeling en structuur in de 
theologie van M.-D. Chenu (Alblasserdam, 1982), pp .218-23.
15 The primarily sources in which the phrase has this new meaning are: the 
summons to the Council by John XXIII, dated 25 December 1961; Pacem in Terris 
(encyclical by John XXIII, dated 11 April 1963); Ecclesium suarn (encyclical by Paul 
VI, dated 6 August 1964); Gaudium et Spes, no. 4 (7 December 1965).
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of the destiny that a people descries in its history and with being and becom­
ing aware of the roots of that history.
This concrete historical theology also has a moral dimension, as Jon 
Sobrino, a theologian working in El Salvador, stresses. From the perspective 
of such a theology the moral issue is characterized not by the question “What 
should I do?” but by the question “What needs to be done urgently here and 
now for the sake of justice?” In this framework the words of Jesus—“If any­
one would come after me, he must deny himself and take up his cross and 
follow me” (Matthew 16:24)—do not constitute the final piece of a Catholic 
pietism with an anti-Enlightenment sentiment (2029) but the starting point of 
the fundamentally moral dimension that is present in the choice for a faith 
described as following Jesus. The goal of this moral attitude is universal re­
conciliation, and this reconciliation is viewed as the fruit of justice.
